DILEMMAS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AID: DONORS, NGOs AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN SRI LANKA by Orjuela, Camilla
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Number 1, January 2005. 
 
 
 
 
DILEMMAS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AID: DONORS, NGOs AND 
THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN SRI LANKA 
 
CAMILLA ORJUELA  
_____________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT 
 
It is increasingly recognised that civil society has an important role to play in conflict resolution by involving and 
educating grass roots and granting legitimacy to top-level peace processes. A growing interest among donor 
agencies to support peace has paved the way for an influx of funds to ‘civil society’, often to NGOs doing peace 
education and campaigning. This paper looks at the case of Sri Lanka, where an ongoing peace process attempting 
to end a twenty year old civil war fought along ethnic lines has made donor support for civic peace work a burning 
issue. The paper argues that civil society does not only need to be constructed, but also deconstructed, and the 
amorphous civil society concept analysed critically in its local context. Such a deconstruction reveals that civil 
society in Sri Lanka contains divides along ethnic and political lines, and is an arena where contradictory struggles 
are waged. People organise to promote peace and democratic values, but also to protest attempts at conflict 
resolution. Donor funding of peace NGOs feeds into the conflict between pro-peace and hard-line groups and risks 
accentuating social conflicts. The paper also discusses some problems in the relations between foreign donors and 
local organisations, that is, the bureaucratisation of peace work and the fact that NGOs are held accountable to 
donors rather than to the local population. It is argued that the interests of donors and recipients, and the 
difficulties involved in selecting whom to fund, need to be discussed and problematised to avoid pitfalls when 
supporting civil society peace work.   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1990s, conflict resolution and peace building have become important 
components of development discourse and policy. The mandate of international 
donors has been widened towards increased focus on human rights, democracy, and 
support for peaceful settlements of internal violent conflicts. An increased awareness 
of the links between underdevelopment and insecurity and Western interest in 
promoting peace in poorer countries has encouraged Western development 
organisations to address conflict resolution, and thus involve more explicitly in 
politics (see Duffield 2001). Relief and development aid ought to satisfy emergency 
or development needs while also seeking to ‘do no harm’ (that is, not exacerbate 
conflicts). Aid is also increasingly seen as a means of providing incentives for a 
peace-promoting environment (Anderson 1999; DAC 1997).  
 
There has also been increased donor interest in working with and 
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Non-state actors are brought forth 
as suitable partners in development when governments have proved to be corrupt, 
inefficient and even violent. It is estimated that more than 15 percent of all 
development aid is channelled through non-state actors today (World Bank 2003). 
With respect to peace building, NGOs are believed to be more efficient and suitable to 
work for peace than state actors, as they are less visible, less expensive and more 
flexible (Ross & Rothman 1999: 1). NGOs are perceived to be less constrained by 
narrow mandates, able to talk to several parties without losing their credibility and 
capable of dealing directly with the grassroots population (van Tongeren 1998). Apart 
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from using civil society actors as tools for development and peace building, 
‘supporting civil society’ has emerged as a goal in itself, in the quest for peace, 
democracy and economic development. What exactly ‘civil society’ is and how it can 
contribute to peace is not always specified. This paper looks at the case of Sri Lanka, 
where an ongoing peace process, which attempts to end a twenty year old civil war 
fought along ethnic lines, has made donor support for civil society peace work a 
burning issue. The paper argues that civil society does not only need to be 
constructed, but also deconstructed, and the amorphous civil society concept analysed 
critically in its local context. The paper also points towards some problems with 
foreign assistance to civil society peace building, in donor-recipient relations, and in 
relations between groups within the recipient society. 
 
The war in Sri Lanka has been waged between the government 
dominated by the Sinhalese majority and a guerrilla movement named Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighting for autonomy for the Tamil minority in the 
north and east of the island. In February 2002, a cease-fire agreement was reached and 
currently a peace process is under way with Norwegian facilitation.  
 
 
AIDING PEACE IN SRI LANKA 
 
The flow of foreign development assistance to Sri Lanka has largely been influenced 
by the changing ideologies of development adopted by political parties in power, 
foreign interest and Cold War politics. Until Sri Lanka’s economic turn towards 
market liberalisation in 1977, development aid was modest (Bastian 2003). 
Widespread ethnic violence and the onset of civil war in 1983 was another watershed 
towards increased foreign aid, now in the field of relief and rehabilitation.  
 
Sri Lanka has been able to attract a relatively large volume of foreign 
development assistance – in the recent years about six percent of GDP (Bush 2001: 
13), or an average of about US$ 600 million yearly (Ofstad 2002: 169; AP 2003). 
Donors have largely been unaware of the ethnic implications and sensitive nature of 
many development programmes. For example, large irrigation projects involved 
landless Sinhalese people being resettled in traditional Tamil areas. Donors responded 
to escalated political violence after 1983 by trying to ‘do development as usual’, 
noting the effects of the political violence on development projects, but failing to 
problematise how their development programmes related to and fed into the conflicts. 
In the 1990s, human rights and peace building entered the agenda of the donors. 
Largely in response to pre-1990 human rights abuses committed by the Sri Lankan 
government, Canada decided to channel all of its development aid through non-
governmental actors. The 1994 change of government, and the subsequent peace 
attempt, was a dawn for increased ‘peace aid’. Sweden and Norway reformulated their 
aid programmes to explicitly focus on peace building. This included efforts to support 
education and language reform, devolution of power and government campaigns for 
‘national integration.’ The largest donors, such as the Asian Development Bank, 
World Bank and Japan, have sought since 1998 to include consciousness of peace and 
conflict impact in their programmes (Ofstad 2002). Donor threats to withdraw aid if 
the government failed to improve its human rights record, contributed to a reduction 
in human rights violations in 1990 (Wickramasinghe 2001: 53).  However, no such 
pressure was used against the government when it escalated the war after the 
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breakdown of talks in 1995. Civil society organisations working for peace, human 
rights and democratic restructuring have increasingly received funding from Western 
governments since the mid-1990s.  
 
In the current peace process, foreign aid plays a crucial role, pledging a 
peace dividend that motivates the parties to participate in the process. 
‘Normalisation’, rebuilding and resettlement in the north and east have been high on 
the negotiation agenda and initially provided a space for cooperation between the 
government and the LTTE, which found a shared interest in attracting foreign funding 
to rebuild the war torn northeast of the country. Donors responded generously, 
pledging 4.5 billion US dollars at a donor meeting in Tokyo in June 2003. But as 
recently as July 2004, the peace process was stalled, and much of the aid money 
locked, due to an LTTE boycott of the peace talks.  
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID 
 
The civil society concept has entered development discourse from political theory, 
and is commonly used to describe a realm where people organise voluntarily and 
separately from the state, market and family spheres, to protect their interests and 
values (White 1994: 379). Civil society is thus more than its organisations; it is the 
sphere of voluntary organisation, in which civil society organisations function. Policy 
makers have tended to subscribe to a normative theory of civil society – of civil 
society as ‘civilised’ and a strategic factor which creates social capital, i.e., trust, 
cooperation over ethnic, religious and other divisions, inclusiveness and open debate 
(see Putnam 1992; van Rooy 1998). With the existence of social capital, democracy, 
economic development, peace and harmony are commonly considered to be more 
likely to prevail. For instance, studies of civil society and social capital in India imply 
that inclusiveness in ways of organising and associating, and interaction over ethnic 
boundaries can serve to prevent violence (Varshney 2002). A strong civil society may 
thus be considered worth supporting and building up for its own sake and for its role 
in encouraging other development objectives. However, this paper understands civil 
society as an arena where contradictory forces are at play. People organise in the civil 
society sphere not only around ‘civil’ democratic and liberal values, but also around 
values that can be defined as ‘uncivil’ (see White 1994; Bastian 1999; Kaldor 2003).  
 
Strengthening democracy has been a main aim for foreign assistance to 
civil society in ‘developing countries’. An active civil society is seen to promote 
political participation and the articulation of group-based interests, to be able to 
counterweight the power of the state, hold governments accountable, as well as to 
create a democratic culture. But in practice, democracy aid has often been channelled 
to a narrow group of professional NGOs engaged in activities explicitly related to 
democratisation. As civil society organisations are frequently organised along ethnic 
lines, a strengthening of ‘civil society’ might contribute to increased ethnic 
polarisation (Söderberg & Ohlson 2002: 18ff). A well functioning democracy is in 
itself a mechanism to non-violently negotiate and solve conflicts between groups. 
However, in the case of Sri Lanka, where a democratic system (with regular regime 
changes) has been in place since the 1930s, majority rule has contributed to the 
political and economic marginalisation of the minority ethnic groups.  
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Donors and international NGOs have in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
increasingly focussed on civil society support for peace in violence ridden countries. 
An active civil society, in the form of local associations and organisations, is 
promoted in its role as ‘stabilisation points’ or ‘voices of peace’ and in its capacity to 
promote dialogue and cooperation in divided societies, provide peace education, 
revitalise traditional methods of conflict resolution, and strengthen skills for 
negotiation (DAC 1997: 37ff). The notion of the close contact between civil society 
actors and the general population makes civil society a key component in efforts to 
build a peace constituency, which can legitimise top level peace initiatives or 
agreements.  
 
WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY IN SRI LANKA? 
 
The partisan and ethnic polarisation of Sri Lankan society leaves a relatively small 
space for civil society activity. Early democratization forced upper class politicians 
into an alliance with rural lower middle class, which gave way to political patronage 
(Stokke 1998). The expansion of the state sector and the creation of a welfare state in 
the 1950s and 60s made the state the dominant source of almost everything that the 
citizens desired – with politicians and state bureaucrats in control of its distribution. 
This also contributed to deeply rooted perceptions among ordinary people of 
themselves as passive receivers of what politicians deliver. When foreign aid and 
NGOs were brought in from the 1970s and onwards, they came to reinforce these 
same expectations (Hettige 2000: 10f).  
 
The first modern civil society organisations were Christian, working in 
the social sphere. These were soon to be followed by similar Buddhist, Hindu and 
Muslim organisations (Saravanamuttu 1998). At a community level, traditional 
funeral and village societies remain important in local processes of social organisation 
around issues of common concern. Nevertheless, most locally based organisations 
have been established by and depend upon state resources or foreign aid. Markus 
Mayer compares the Sri Lankan weak civil society activity with the strong village-
based social movements in the South Indian state of Kerala, which like Sri Lanka is 
characterised by high literacy rates and other favourable social indicators. He 
concludes that in Sri Lanka ‘people have developed a passive “receiving-mentality” 
rather than the awareness to actively demand the fulfilment of certain needs from the 
respective authorities’, i.e., political patronage substitutes for a demanding civil 
society (Mayer 2000: 167).  
 
The years of war have further contributed to the weakening of civil 
society. The ethnic polarisation resulting from political and violent conflict impinges 
on civil society, which is ethnically divided. Many NGOs and civic groups are close 
to mono-ethnic, and contacts between the south of the country and the war affected 
northeast have been relatively restricted. This Sinhalese-Tamil division also marks the 
university system and mass media. Fear and violence in war zones have discouraged 
the taking up of leadership roles in civic organisations (Goodhand, Lewer & Hulme 
1999: 21), and unnecessary cross-ethnic contact has been seen upon with suspicion. 
Displaced people have moved, resided and received assistance in mono-ethnic 
settlements, which has further accentuated ethnic polarisation (Forut 2001: 16; 
Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999).  
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‘In Sri Lanka we don’t have civil society – only uncivil society’ is a 
remark I have often heard when telling about my research topic. This refers to the fact 
that voluntary popular mobilisation throughout history has often been along racist or 
sectarian lines, starting with anti-Christian agitations during British rule and evident 
much later in anti-Tamil campaigns in the 1980s. Several Sinhalese and Buddhist 
organisations continue to organise rallies and debates opposing peace negotiations and 
political concessions to the ethnic minorities.  
 
Many non-governmental organisations concerned with peace, human 
rights and democratic reform were established in the 1970s in response to ethnic riots 
and government repression. Much of the influx of foreign relief funds after the 1983 
anti-Tamil violence was handled by NGOs. There is an array of Sri Lankan 
organisations working for peace; professional conflict resolution organisations such as 
the National Peace Council, research institutions such as the International Centre for 
Ethnic Studies and Centre for Policy Alternatives, cultural groups like Centre for 
Performing Arts, women’s organisations, the Movement for Inter Racial Justice and 
Equality, the large Gandhi and Buddhist inspired Sarvodaya movement, as well as a 
number of smaller organisations which have become increasingly interested in doing 
peace work. These actors have strived to build popular support for peace through 
education and media campaigns, pressure leaders to pursue a negotiated political 
solution to the conflict, protest against human rights violations, and provide space for 
people to meet and communicate across ethnic divides.  
 
Along with the influx of foreign aid, a professionalisation of civil 
society organisations has taken place, and the division between paid NGO staff 
mainly concentrated in Colombo, and voluntary based groups in other parts of the 
country has widened. The gaps between an English speaking middle class NGO 
community and volunteers with a different background make it difficult for the peace 
NGOs to mobilise the masses. This difficulty is augmented by the fragmentation of 
the NGO sector. Attempts at cooperation between peace NGOs are obstructed by the 
competition between organisations, as well as by ethnic and partisan divisions. The 
rise of foreign funded NGOs in Sri Lanka paralleled the decline and weakening of the 
state. The relationship between the state and civil society organisations has in periods 
been tense. State repression of popular protests, and the attempt to control (or even 
restrain) NGOs have characterized this relationship, especially up to the early 1990s.  
 
In the mid-1990s, the election campaign and victory of a political 
alliance, which promised negotiations and an end to the ethnic conflict, spurred 
optimism, increased civil society campaigning for peace and simultaneously gave rise 
to an increased interest among donors to support ‘peace work’. The breakdown of the 
negotiations and the government’s turn to a war-for-peace strategy was, however, met 
by silence by most peace groups, many of which had explicitly supported the 
government in its peace efforts, and like the President thought that violence now was 
the only remaining alternative. Civil society peace activities regained some of their 
strength at the end of the 1990s. The 2002 cease-fire and peace process have granted 
new optimism, although civil society organisations largely take on a low-key, 
supportive role as the government pushes the process forward.  
 
In the war affected north and east of the island the military regimes of 
the government forces, the LTTE and other Tamil militants have not allowed for an 
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independent civil society. Local organisations do exist, for instance organisations 
linked to the Church, temple societies, farmers’ organisations, cooperatives, trade 
associations and organisations involved in relief and development. But the space to 
voice political concerns has been severely limited, and civil society has not been able 
to play an active role in peace building (see Shanmugaratnam 2002: 11). The links to 
the south of the island and to other ethnic groups have been weak. Tamils and 
Sinhalese who have experienced different sides of the war due to logistical difficulties 
hold different views of what constitutes ‘peace’. The opening up of the north, started 
with the peace process beginning in 2002, has paved the way for possibilities to 
(re)build links between northern and southern civil society, and increased 
communication with and understanding of the ethnic ‘other’ and his/her war suffering.   
 
THE AID RELATIONSHIP 
 
In spite of an increased awareness among donors of the potentially harmful or peace 
building effects of development projects, and the recognition of the need to 
‘mainstream’ peace and conflict impact in development programming, there is a 
tendency to concentrate assistance to NGOs which explicitly do peace activities, e.g., 
conflict resolution training, peace education, media campaigning and research. The 
word `peace’ has become a buzzword in unlocking funding opportunities. This has 
resulted in a rush among NGOs to do peace work. Instead of bringing in the peace 
dimension in all their programmes, donors tend to isolate peace work in different 
administrative units and specific programmes. By this, the opportunity to generate 
incentives for peace on a broader scale, in development projects, is not seized. NGOs 
involved in development work could for instance provide alternatives to the war 
economy, support demobilisation, cater to the needs of deprived and frustrated 
groups, and cultivate cooperation across ethnic lines around common development 
concerns (see Bush 2001).  
 
The donor driven discourse on partnership between donors and their 
recipients does not erase the unequal relationship between the two. Although most 
NGO representatives interviewed in this study maintain that they have not had to 
adjust their programmes to meet the desires of donors, they have been drawn towards 
professionalisation and had to adjust to the bureaucracy of the aid agencies. The 
increased amount of paper work and curtailed flexibility is sometimes problematic, as 
described by one peace activist:  
 
The problem with the funds is that they always nowadays force you to 
be professional […] professionalism and voluntarism, and a social 
movement and professionalism are contradictions […] you cannot write 
a project proposal for three years […]; in a situation like Sri Lanka you 
will never know when you will have a good opportunity to direct your 
whole energy, your whole organisation into some kind of campaign. If 
there is a Sinhala extremist campaign, if there is an anti-Tamil riot, if 
there is prospects of peace…  
 
At the same time, project (rather than programme) funding and the lack of 
institutional learning of aid agencies, which shift their personnel between countries on 
a two or three year basis, discourages long-term planning and makes the work 
piecemeal. The NGO dependency on the outside funding is in some instances 
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extremely high; professionalisation has come to replace voluntarism. Sometimes 
bureaucratic inefficiency causes NGO personnel to sit around waiting for project 
money to come through. The demands of donors of co-funding of projects sometimes 
trap the NGOs in a catch 22 situation when no donor wants to be the first one to 
promise financial support. Different directives of reporting and budgets between the 
different funders are another bureaucratic hassle. The necessity for donors to show 
quick and visible results in order to motivate spending is a problem in a field of 
activity, which does not allow for evident, short-term impacts.  
 
The Sri Lankan society and polity is largely centralised around 
Colombo. This is true also for foreign funded civil society organisations. Donor 
agencies are heavily Colombo centred, and often circumscribed to contacts with 
English speaking elite. Thus, funding of civil society peace work is largely confined 
to Colombo, and only partly ‘trickle-out’ from the capital towards smaller 
organisations around the island. NGOs are thus often seen as representing an English 
speaking, educated elite. The hunt for funding has fostered a competitive environment 
among NGOs, and a need to prioritise the promotion and survival of the organisation 
over the overall goal of peace. However, with the increased influx of money for peace 
work in the early 2000s, the poor capacity of NGOs to make use of it has also been 
noticed. This while civic leaders in remote areas, for instance the war torn north of the 
country, observe great needs for reconstruction and reconciliation, but have heard of 
no prospects to obtain peace aid. 
 
FOREIGN AIDED PEACE WORK AND CONFLICTS IN SRI LANKAN 
SOCIETY 
 
Foreign funding to NGO peace work has been under harsh criticism in Sri Lanka, and 
there are reasons to listen to those critical voices. Firstly, some of the concerns they 
are raising are legitimate and important to discuss. Secondly, although these voices do 
not necessarily represent the general population, they indicate that important groups 
feel threatened or marginalised in society, and harbour frustrations that can spur 
conflicts.   
 
The most vociferous opposition to peace NGOs and peace processes 
comes from Sinhalese nationalist groups that are often linked to Buddhist clergy 
and/or political parties in opposition. The Buddhist clergy has used involvement in 
voluntary associations as a means to stretch their power. These organisations trace 
their roots to the pre-independence nationalist movements, but change name and 
shape according to issues of the day. Preserving the unity and sovereignty of the (holy 
Buddhist) country is the key motivation for their mobilisation (see Schalk 1988). The 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), today Sri Lanka’s third largest political party, has 
similarly been efficient in mobilising public rallies against peace processes – the party 
has a background of ultra-violent rebellion against India’s intervention to ‘solve’ the 
conflict in the late 1980s. It has traditionally been easy to gain political support for 
parties who play on Sinhalese nationalist feelings and fear of the foreigner and the 
Tamils, something that lies behind the breakdown of several attempts at Sinhalese-
Tamil settlements in the past. In the 1994 elections, however, the popular support was 
for peace and negotiations, a pattern that was repeated in 2001 and gave way for the 
current peace process.  
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It is often those who are marginalised by the processes of economic and 
political transformation which come with market liberalisation and globalisation, e.g., 
non English speaking elite groups and religious leaders, who take on narrow 
nationalist positions and oppose peace processes. The NGO personnel and peace 
activists, on the other hand, tend to belong to the new open-minded elite, who takes 
advantage of the restructuring of society (Hettige 1998). Foreign funding to that 
group, and not to the ‘losers of globalisation’ might in this context increase the feeling 
of marginalisation and frustration of the latter, pushing them towards reinforced 
parochial views and intensified anti-peace protests.  
 
The critics of peace NGOs argue that the NGOs do not have legitimacy, 
but are manipulated by foreign interests. Peace activists in foreign funded 
organisations are accused of ‘working for money, rather than for peace’, and the NGO 
sector is alleged to be corrupt. This might not be a totally unfounded accusation, but 
has to be seen in the wider context of a society where the police, the judiciary, 
politicians and bureaucrats are considered even more corrupt. The lack of 
transparency regarding what NGOs actually do and how they use their money 
contributes to the insecurity about their motives and honesty. Foreign funded NGOs 
also tend to direct their accountably towards donors, i.e., they put much effort into 
proving to the important foreigners that they are efficient and relevant, but fail to do 
so to people of their own society (see Hulme 1994).  
  
Moreover, the support to NGOs to do politically sensitive peace work, 
involving the changing of attitudes, mobilising of people, large media campaign and 
advocacy work, has been described as a privatisation of foreign policy (Goonatilake 
2001; Duffield 2001). Aid agencies are put in charge of foreign policy in countries too 
small and to far away to gain much attention at Ministries of Foreign Affairs, as has 
been the case of for instance Swedish policy towards Sri Lanka. Aid is used to 
pressure the state towards peace, but also to engineer a transformation of whole 
societies, including people’s attitudes, the political system, and the power balance 
between different sections of society. By allowing foreign funded NGOs to work in 
the war zones and border areas, the government gives up some of its sovereignty 
(Wickramasinghe, 1997). Campaigning for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and 
third party involvement has (especially before the current peace process) been 
considered a surrender of sovereignty. The support to NGOs in the war zones is 
viewed by many Sinhalese as providing ‘foreign’ help to the LTTE, and the NGOs as 
‘a fifth column of the Tigers’.  
 
A question that arises is if it is indeed possible to build a peace 
movement in Sri Lanka using foreign aid money. This matter is brought to a head in 
the mobilisation of grassroots people. In Sri Lanka, it is not feasible to talk about a 
massive people’s movement for peace, in which the public actively involves. This 
can, among other things, be traced to the fact that most Sinhalese are more concerned 
with daily survival and raising costs of living than with peace, while for the Tamils, 
publicly voicing their views has been a security risk. NGOs organising mass rallies or 
meetings for peace often have to provide donor funded transportation and lunch 
packets for villagers to attend meetings, e.g., in Colombo. This has provoked 
questions about the genuineness of the peace movement, whether such a movement 
can, or at all should, be created from the outside, and about the ethics of donors 
making this type of mobilisation possible. One critic of the peace NGOs described the 
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mobilisation to a peace convention thus: ‘the participants are “targets”, they are 
selected, “educated” in the ideology and then paid to attend these meetings’ 
(Goonatilake 2001: 32). Although this is an exaggerated picture, it points at the 
problem of legitimacy and the question of who the peace NGOs represent – the will of 
the people or of donors and elite groups.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Civil society actors have an important, but complementary, role to play in peace 
building (see Orjuela, 2003). Much of their work, e.g., efforts to build peace 
constituencies and raise awareness of the roots of conflicts and need for resolution, 
bridge ethnic cleavages, lobby political leaders and the international community, as 
well as relief and development work in the war areas, has been made possible through 
foreign aid. But what can be done about the dilemmas involved in the foreign support 
for such civic efforts; with the difficulties to define and support ‘civil’ actors, the 
unequal aid relationship and the risk of exacerbate conflicts within the recipient 
society? The dilemmas analysed in this article are relevant not only to the case of Sri 
Lanka, but is part of a global pattern of post-colonial relations between rich and 
powerful donor agencies and poorer governments, organisations and peoples. It is 
easy to see how donors, being in control of the money, are in charge of setting the 
agenda, designing the rules and initiating changes in the societies they intervene in. 
However, the power relations are not as simple as those of dominator and dominated. 
A multiplicity of interests is involved and make up the field of interaction.  
 
The donors are not merely after control, but work also with the 
ambitions to ‘do good’, satisfy tax payers at home, spend their allocated money, gain 
international prominence and shares of the aid market, e.g., by claiming expertise in 
an area, and by being first in a new field, and enhance the aid industry, and thus 
secure and expand employment and advancement opportunities. The recipient states, 
on the other hand, are interested in foreign aid as a way to fund or support their 
programmes, to increase wealth (personal or for the people at large), and legitimacy. 
Aid, which circumvents the recipient states and goes directly to non-governmental 
actors, may however work to decrease legitimacy of those governments and to present 
NGOs as more potent than their weak host governments. The NGOs strive 
simultaneously to support peace, give a voice to their members or target groups, 
acquire resources, secure livelihood for their staff, and to market and sustain their 
organisations. The numerous and shifting interests that govern the relations between 
these different actors can provide openings for a renegotiation of the rules of the 
donor-recipient relations. But the different interests need to be made explicit, in order 
to make possible a dialogue about the impact of foreign aid, the triggering of social 
conflicts and the aid relationship. I will here suggest four issues that need to be 
brought into this crucial debate.  
 
Firstly, when researching or supporting civil society peace work it is 
important not to confine the understanding of civil society to certain NGOs doing 
peace work or other work seen as useful by donors, but to also take into account the 
civic organisations and movements that mobilise against peace initiatives. The 
challenge for both donors and NGOs is to invite these vociferous groups to the 
discussion about their future society, to unveil the positive contributions they can 
make and see to that they are not further alienated and increasingly frustrated in peace 
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processes. It is important that those who strive to foster attitudes conducive to peace 
distinguish between ideas and people; that they marginalize parochial nationalist 
ideas, but not the groups and persons that tend to hold those ideas.  
 
Secondly, the issue of legitimacy and representativity of civil society 
organisations warrants more research and discussion. It is not unproblematic that 
donors, who have the power to select whom to fund, are in power of defining who are 
‘the good guys’ and to distinguish the ‘civil’ from the ‘uncivil’ in societies such as the 
Sri Lankan one. Support to certain groups, with certain attitudes, political opinions 
and contacts, gives signals of social engineering and involvement in ‘internal affairs’. 
Transparency when it comes to the criteria for, and interests behind, civil society 
funding is important to counter rumours and calumny. A more open funding process, 
which make possible also for organisations from areas far away from the capital, 
which need only smaller amounts of money, and to which English is not known, 
would be a good option. Moreover, it is the responsibility of NGOs to direct their 
accountability more towards their own society than towards funders. Donors can 
encourage this by being more flexible when it comes to their demands on NGOs for 
reporting and administration. More efforts can also be taken to make reports available, 
and readable, to the public. 
 
It is also important to initiate a discussion, among academics as well as 
donors and actors in recipient societies, about ‘the political economy of aid’, i.e., the 
interests behind foreign involvement in peace building in countries like Sri Lanka. 
Western business interests, including those of the ‘aid industry’, the trends in 
development policy and the need to show results, the need for stability, as well as the 
inherently unequal power relations embedded in development assistance need to be 
openly discussed. This so that recipient societies as well as donors can be better 
prepared to deal with them.  
 
Thirdly, the focus on NGOs as peace builders risks outshining other 
important actors.  Mass based organisations, such as trade unions or political parties, 
have so far received little attention from donors, in spite of their potential to both 
reach and mobilise grassroots people. Institutionalising peace work in government 
structures, e.g., through juridical reform and law enforcement, and in the field of 
education, provides large potentials to make a difference. Much of the competence 
that currently exists in the NGO sector could be used in a more sustainable way if tied 
to and systematically used in the education system. For instance, instead of supporting 
patchy NGO projects, special positions in universities could be offered to political 
analysts and conflict resolution trainers, who could continue their work from that 
more stable platform. 
 
Finally, the focus on explicit peace projects threatens to direct the 
attention away from the peace and conflict impact of other projects, and of 
development policy in general, and make NGOs formulate specific peace activities in 
order to acquire funding. Two measures could be taken against this: (a) The analysis 
of what is peace work should be broad, and can be done by academics and donors, 
who need to be well informed of the local context. NGOs doing various kinds of 
development work should be able to receive support and be recognised as doing peace 
building, for instance in their efforts to strengthen marginalised groups, without 
having to reformulate or redirect their programmes according to trends in the donor 
 10
Camilla Orjuela, Dilemmas of Civil Society 
world. (b) The issue of how development work can augment conflicts by building in 
inequalities, or contribute to equality and cooperation if designed in a sensitive way, 
can be further explored by researchers and donors, and an awareness of this can be 
spread to NGOs and other actors.  
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